Bp And Partner Firms Made Risky Decisions Before Spill
BP AND its partners made a series of cost-cutting decisions that ultimately contributed
to theoilspill that ravaged theGulf of Mexicocoast over the summer, theWhite Houseoilspill commission said on Wednesday.
In its final report on causes of the largest offshoreoilspill in U.S. history, the commission said BP and its collaborators on the doomed Macondo well had lacked a system to ensure their actions were safe.
"Whether purposeful or not, many of the decisions that BP,Halliburton, andTransoceanmade that increased the risk of the Macondo blowout clearly saved those companies significant time (and money)," the report said.
Created byPresidentBarack Obamain the midst of the BP spill, the panel is the first government-sanctioned group to wrap up its probe of the causes of the drilling disaster.
Charged with guiding the future of offshore drilling, the commission will release its full review of the spill and its aftermath next week.
Although the commission lacks authority to establish policy or punish companies, its conclusions could have a bearing on future criminal and civil cases relating to the spill.
The findings contradict its initial report in November, which found no evidence that Macondo project workers cut corners to save money.
After receiving criticism for that finding, the panel sought to clarify those comments, saying it did not mean companies involved with the accident had never sacrificed safety to save money.
A chart by the commission was later leaked by themedia detailing decisionsmade while drilling the Macondo well that saved time, but increased risks.
Eventually, the panel made the document public and the final report included a similar chart.
The conclusions released so far align with many previous comments from the panel, as well as initial results of another major probe conducted by a scientific panel.
The commission's report ultimately blamed management failures for the April 20 explosion that ruptured the Macondo well and unleased millions of barrels ofoilinto the Gulf.
The commission also concluded the Gulf spill was not an isolated incident caused by "rogue industry or government officials".
"The root causes are systemic and, absent significant reform in both industry practices and government policies, might well recur," the report said.
The report outlines major missteps by BP; byHalliburton, which oversaw cementing for the Macondo well; and byTransocean, owner and operator of the Deepwater Horizon rig.
BP is faulted for not using a "cementbond log" or anotherdiagnostic toolto test stability of the cementing.
The report said BP's "fundamental mistake" was failure to exercise caution before relying on thecementas a barrier to the flow ofoiland gas up the well.
BP was also blasted for various decisions made as it attempted temporarily to abandon the Macondo well. BP's decision to displace mud in the riser pipe before setting acementplug or another barrier "unnecessarily and substantially increased the risk of a blowout", the report said.
BP said in a statement that it supports the commission's efforts to determine the causes of the accident. "BP is working with regulators and the industry to ensure that the lessons learned from Macondo lead to improvements in operations in deep water drilling," the company said.
The report reiterated the panel's prior criticism ofHalliburton'scementjob on the project.Halliburtondocuments strongly suggest the company may have pumpedcementinto the well before receiving any test data that indicated it would be stable, the report said.
Halliburtondisputed the commission's accusations about itscementtesting. The company said in a statement that it had received test results showing itscementformula would be stable before carrying out the Macondo job. The commission "selectively omitted information we provided to them,"Halliburtonsaid.
Transoceanand BP were chided for lacking an internal procedure for interpreting negative pressure tests, which workers on the Deepwater Horizon rig misread.
In addition,Transoceanfailed to communicate to crew lessons learned from a similar incident on one of the company's' rigs that almost led to an accident in theNorth Seafour months before the Macondo accident.
In response to the report,Transoceansaid the company's workers were "well trained" and considered among the best in the business. The company also said that consistent with industry standards, the final procedures on the rig were directed by BP engineers.
"Based on the limited information made available to them, theTransocean crew took appropriate actions to gain control of the well," aTransocean spokesmansaid.
The commission saidU.S. governmentregulators lacked the authority, resources and expertise to prevent safety lapses.
Since the spill, theObama administrationhas restructured the federal offshore drilling regulator and implemented a raft of new regulations aimed at strengthening government oversight.
by: Merinews
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