The Invalidity of Miracles
To begin I will attempt to define Hume's' definition of a miracle
, and what is meant by 'proof' and 'probability' in regards to testimonies for miracles. Hume's' definition of a miracle is an occurrence that violates the laws of nature, where the laws of nature are established as an expectation by the causal observations of all collective experiences. A miracle has to be something completely against our conceptions of possibility, something that has never happened before. If it happened 5,000 years ago, if it happens every six months, or happened last Tuesday, it cannot be a miracle.
A proof, by the name, is somewhat misleading. A proof is not a logical proof and does not actually prove something, but is a statement that whatever you are applying it to has never been disproved. In other words, no counter-factual exists for the proof. Earlier on in human history one could have stated the proof; "Whatever goes up, must come down." Now we are able to launch things out of the atmosphere at such velocities that they shall not return. At a point in history the above statement would, however, be considered a proof. A proof of something can lead you to be pretty certain that whatever it is asserting is true, but does not allow for complete certainty. In your notes was given the example; "The sun will rise tomorrow," as a proof. When speaking on epistemology, another of my professors used this same example next to another example. That example was that there is a turkey farm, and every day at 4:00am a bell rings, and that means it's time for food, so the turkeys leave their coop to go eat. This happens every day, and has never failed to be the daily occurrence so the turkeys are sure it will always happen this way. One day shortly before Thanksgiving the bell rings, but this time there is no food. The turkeys are gathered up and slaughtered for Thanksgiving. There is always the chance of not fully understanding the mechanics behind an event, and therefore we are only as sure about the sun coming up tomorrow as the turkeys were of their next meal, for these are merely proofs based on past experiences where our experiences can be misleading and we certainly hold no authority over the future.
A probability is a weaker statement than a proof that allows much more room for failure for an asserted outcome to occur. A probability establishes the likeliness of a possible event. An example could be "You will loose 50lbs on Jenny Craig!" Because of the small print at the bottom of Jenny Craig advertisements that states; "Results not typical," it establishes itself as a mere probability. It is possible for it to happen, but it has been disproved in some previous known instances. Based on how often the object of a probability has been shown to be wrong, or has failed to occur, you can assign a strength value to the probability. The statement; "Because almost no human lives past the age of 110 John will probably not live to be 120," is a pretty strong probability because only a handful of humans are known to have lived longer than that. Also other conditions come into play when considering a probability, and indeed even a proof, such as the character and demeanor of the individual giving testimony, but we will save this for later.
Upon looking at the issue of testimonies on the occurrence of miracles, even though it is out of order, I wish to first approach the concept of a proof as it applies to these testimonies. One of Hume's conclusions in Inquiry X, and the one which I address here, is; "No testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less a proof." This being said, I carry on to lay down Hume's argument for this conclusion, and additional words to help my own clarity of understanding.
On proof's Hume's' primary argument points out that all, or nearly all, monotheistic religions have given testimony to miracles initiated by their deity. If a monotheistic follower of God A claims he witnessed a miracle caused by God A, and a monotheistic follower of God B claims he witnessed a miracle caused by God B, we know that both of them cannot be right. I find this argument to be fully sufficient to logically rule-out the possibility for the testimony of a miracle to be a proof as in the example above either conclusion being true invalidates the other by being an exclusive statement, and by proving the other testimony false it invalidates itself as a proof. Hume continues on with this argument to state that no religion's existence may be based on the occurrence of a miracle because the above example would, as with the miracles, make each religion contradictory to each other and invalid. If one religion contradicts the others, by being built upon an exclusive proof, than none of them may exist on a solid foundation. This is the same result we see with any contradictory exclusive statements.
Also, similarly, all experience, which is applied against a proof, must be uniform otherwise the proof is invalidated. The nature of a miracle is something that is not consistent with the laws of nature, which one has compiled as an expectation by all previous experiences, so in witnessing something that goes against these expectations one is left with, despite their own observations, wondering whether they themselves should believe this contradictory occurrence. It could be merely an event, which their experiences were ignorant of in building an expected conception of the laws of nature, or it could be a hallucination, perhaps a dream, etc. Likewise it could be an actual miracle, which because it is created by a power outside of this universe is not from, nor part of, any compiled laws of nature would not alter the observer's original conception of nature. This would allow for the observer to maintain a uniform experience when it comes to the laws of nature with those who did not observe a miracle, so a proof is still possible, but the variable possibility here is the actual observer him/herself is still left with their own uncertainty, or the possibility of such regardless of their own degree of belief, which must be fully recognized and carried on as part of their testimony to be assessed by a greater collective of experience to further refine any accepted belief in the miracle from being invalidated by a non-uniform experience (a.k.a. some one has experience of the alleged miracle being an event of and in nature, not of and from a being outside the laws of nature). With every additional person contributing their compiled experiences to the assertion of a proof it becomes more likely that individuals containing relevant experience (those being ones that have been in a situation which would grant them observation and insight into the occurrence of an asserted proof, such as being on Pluto to observe any existing giraffes, or being in a place consistent with the possible occurrence of miracles) will have weighed their experiences against the asserted proof, therefore making the proof stronger.
Next we come to probability, as approached by Hume. To consider a probability is to look at the likeliness of the event occurring, compared to the likeliness it has not. This comparison begins with assigning a probability value to the event happening, and then creating a value for it not happening. An event like a miracle would have an understandably large chance of not happening at any given time. So for a positive occurrence resulting from a probability, like the event of a miracle, to be believed the likeliness that the event happened must far outweigh it's opposite possibility (not happening).
So if I put it in terms of stating a probability based assertion, where it has a 60% chance (or some kind of strength of statement value, which I will further refer to as the probability value) compared to the other possible event(s) having a 40% chance of something counter to my claim, one must subtract the negative results from my asserted position and see what that leaves us with. In this situation we have a value of 20% remaining. Is this enough to cause belief in my argument, and if so, to what degree? Sometimes it may, sometimes it may not, depending on the topic at hand. When applying this concept to the testimony of miracles we are given Hume's position that it must be more miraculous that a testimony is false, than the positive occurrence of a miracle is true. If we cannot at least achieve a greater value of probability for a testimony where the two contradictions meet then we cannot be left with any probability nor, proof, that leads us to believe the positive occurrence of a miracle, much less in any religion upon which is based on miracles.
The above is the structure of the primary argument concerning probabilities, but there is a considerable amount that goes into assigning a 'probability value' to an asserted testimony before comparing it to it's counter, which in this case would be the likeliness that the individual claiming to have seen a miracle is wrong, or lying.
The first issues we face with believing an individual's testimony of a miracle are those uncertainties that the observer him/herself faces upon witnessing a miracle as listed above, those being; having misunderstood what they had seen, hallucinated, or been dreaming and for some reason thought that it was real. These possibilities themselves open considerable grounds for doubt, and should be immediately applied to any given testimony, lowering its' probability value against the instance of a miracle. The next possibility that devalues a probability testimony is the individual lying in their account of the miracle.
"[T]here is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves, of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others..."-Hume on Miracles, Coventry.
There are many reasons for which an individual may lie, whether they know they are doing so or not, about witnessing a miracle and different cue's that can tip one off to the fact. Many individuals use the occurrence of a miracle as grounds for the existence of god, or the validity of a religion. While someone like a priest may claim to be more likely to recognize the occurrence of a miracle, they also have a vested interest in such an occurrence. One should always consider the possible motivations of the orator of such a testimony, and weigh any suspicion against their assertion. The orator may have a small side motivation, or they may have a motivation, which is so strong that it is central to their being, such as a priest. Depending on the degree of 'temptation' an individual may be under to fabricate such a testimony as witnessing a miracle the listener can assign an amount that should be subtracted from the probability value of their claim because of this suspicion. An individual giving such a testimony who is of a shady/doubtful character should also elicit suspicion and a corresponding lowering of assigned probability value. One can be tipped off to a deceptive testimony by the orator being too over enthusiastic, or if they show signs of being hesitant or not fully convinced themselves.
The other side of the lying issue is the miss-truth given by those who are unaware that their claims are false. This includes those who suffer from hallucinations, were dreaming, or just misunderstood what they have seen. An individual who is prone to substance abuse, metal problems/insanity, or lacks "...unquestioned good-sense, education, and learning...," adds additional doubt to their claims. Those individual's who are known to lack, or be the opposite, of these conditions contributes a larger probability value to their testimony. Hume also points out the factor of emotional interference. An individual who believes his/herself to be the witness of a miracle are subject to the pleasurable emotions of surprise and wonder, especially at this time in history where society was so much more controlled by and centered around religion and divinity, the effects of which are increased significantly upon being given the chance to spread word of such an event. These emotions can cloud the truth for the observer, where their minds and senses know that the miracle is false, but their emotions cover it up with want for belief that it is real.
So to reduce these explanations to their basic arguments, testimonies as proofs of miracles are not possible because patrons of numerous religions have issued exclusive testimonies of miracles, and in doing so invalidate all such testimonies as proofs. As for testimonies as probabilities, from the very doubts of the observer on what he/she has witnessed, to the possibility of them aiming to deceive with their testimony, be it to further their own ends, or as emotional clouding, lack of adequate experience (ignorance of the subject), or just misunderstanding the events they have witnessed, there are many possibilities that lower the probability value of any given testimony on the occurrence of a miracle. These issues make for Hume's position that no testimony of a miracle has had such a strong probability value as to make the possibility of it's falsity the weaker of the two compared contradictions, and no room is left for a proof.
In the end I find this argument by Hume to be the most logically sound we have seen yet this term. After accepting his definition of proof and probability, which I see as very accurately describing the nature of the two types of testimonies, he leads us to his points with rational arguments, each showing his points quite clearly. The conclusion, and arguments in support, on proof's when it comes to testimonies on miracles is a clear-cut logical proof (as in a 100% certain, as far as we can be certain of logic, conclusion), where I see no space for disagreement. Probability is also dealt with quite well, with the mere query of what testimonies' falsehood has been more miraculous than it's assertion, when that assertion is of an event contradictory to the amassed experiences of all humanity, and this is on top of the numerous variables and conditions that would weight against the probability of a truthful testimony. Were I not already of the opinion of Hume's conclusions, I believe I would stand convinced.
The Invalidity of Miracles
By: algavinn
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