subject: Introduction to the History of Spain 1500 - 1713 [print this page] Introduction to the History of Spain 1500 - 1713
There are two basic interlinked facets to the protracted decline of Spain from 1500 to the 1700s. Firstly there are the economic fluctuations in fortune and secondly we have the military and political aspects. This division has been made because in my opinion the so called economic decline of Spain was not as disastrous as her political decline in comparison to other European nations such as France.
Although there is an undoubted interaction between economic variables and military and economic performance in Spain financial stability did not necessarily guarantee success nor vice versa. In the field of economics it is hard to see any overall collapse in Spain from the heady days of the Catholic Kings to the unfortunate Carlos II. It is true that there were periodic slumps and booms in specific areas of Spain but Spain had never been at any stage an economically strong nation in a broad based sense. I want to illustrate this with reference to three variable of particular importance to the Spanish economy.
Population
Firstly demographic trends. Throughout the sixteenth century there was a fairly rapid increase in population which slackened off towards the end of the century during the infamous plague years of 1596-1610. This decrease in population was compounded by the expulsion of 90,000 Moriscos from Castile alone and of course many more from various parts of Spain most notably Valencia. pestilential holocaust returned in the 1640s and 1670s. The depopulation of the villages was particularly noticeable as people drifted from Old Castile in the north to the towns in New Castile and Andalusia. Seville in particular. Many emigrated to America and many were killed on the battlefields of far flung empire but the downward trend in population only seems to have lasted from 1596 to 1652 after which there was a recovery. Thus we can see that as far as demographic trends were concerned there was no irreversible decline in Spain and this could be a reason for explaining why the decline of Spain took so long i.e. in the late seventeenth century there was a recovery without which Spain would probably have experienced a more precipitous economic collapse. However, rapid rises in taxation linked to fluctuations in population is not a recipe for economic stability.
Agriculture
Secondly agricultural developments must be considered. It used to be argued that the Mesta or sheep owners guild was responsible for Span's economic deterioration because they unbalanced the agricultural base of the economy, overgrazed areas which led to deforestation and drought on a large scale. Their sheep walks ranged from Seville to Leon, Burgas and Logrono. However, there is little evidence to suggest that sheep farming was detrimental to the Spanish economy as a whole. Certainly the textile industry would benefit from a home supply of fine wool and much of the raw material was exported to France and England. In addition many peasants must have relied heavily on sheep herding and may have been submerged beneath the poverty line without it. The alternative to sheep rearing was arable farming but there was little incentive to engage in this since the tasa del trigo and the inequitable tax situation which ground the peasant down in financial obligation to lord, church and state. s a result productivity and production was low and this would contribute to inflation and dearth but the point about discussing agriculture is that Spain's agricultural base was not necessarily as bad as people believe.
Bullion
Let us then consider bullion imports and their effect on the economy. There was already inflation in Spain before the arrival of silver bullion on a large scale due to factors such as aristocratic expenditure, Charles V financed his debts by the distribution of juros or credit bonds, and the increased demand for a limited supply of food from the Castilian population. But the injection of bullion into the economy meant that the Spaniards could not match the balance of trade with their own products and since terms of trade favored foreign imports internal production became depressed and inflation was further aggravated by changes in the money supply via debasement, relative to output. Industrial development was hampered by the crown's fiscal policy and lack of a sufficiently large home market for cheap manufactures because food prices were too high which in turn brings us full circle to our earlier arguments.
Attitudes
Psychological attitudes also tie in with this very well because the social climate in Castile was unfavorable to entrepreneurial activity as the successful became hidalgos and became exempt from tax. Perhaps more importantly there were a distinct lack of investment opportunities or rather unproductive ones such as censos (personal loans) and the above mentioned juros. Failure to keep up with modern techniques meant the relative decline in manufacturing and this in turn was due largely to educational failure under the stranglehold of religion.
Thus it can be seen that simple imports of bullion were not to blame for economic weakness but a whole host of factors. In fact despite the common view bullion imports only declined after the 1590s temporarily and the great mines of Potosi were far from worked out. It is true that treasure fleets were lost in 1629, 1656 and 1657 and the colonists became less reliant on Spanish goods and the administration of the New World Empire got costlier but by the 1660s and 70s more bullion than ever was flowing into Spain even if not necessarily into the king's coffers. However, bullion should not be overestimated in importance because the most significant revenue for the crown came from Castilian taxes.
Wider Context
But perhaps the concept of an economic decline in Spain has been over-emphasized. The decline has to be put into a European context and the seventeenth century saw a general European economic crisis. In addition the chronology of economic decline in Spain is open to debate. Hamilton saw the decline occurring in the seventeenth century whereas Spanish historians thought that the sixteenth century was the crucial period and that the Empire only distorted the economic development of Spain by dislocating trade and industry and wasting manpower as well as overburdening Castile fiscally. Perhaps rather than economic decline Spain simply failed to realize its potential. Although there were very real reverses in demography, prices, trade and production from 1590 to the 1650s after this period there was some economic recovery. Instead of trying to imagine Spain declining steadily from a great point of economic strength we should try to think of Spain's fluctuating and never very stable economic trends. Such fluctuations really deny the fact that Spain's economy declined at all except on a temporary basis. Finally before moving onto the political and military front we should discuss how contemporaries viewed the economic crisis and what measures were in fact put into practice which could account for the more gradual decline of the economy in the first half of the seventeenth century and its modest subsequent revival.
The constant interplay between action and perception is important in the study of Spanish decline. There is a wealth of literary evidence from the period - the arbitristas such as Mata, Moncada and Navarette offered a variety of solutions to the problems of the late 1590s which were spectacularly ignored. However, many sought to explain the series of disasters that confronted Spain at the turn of the century as a result of divine wrath. Castile was falling short of its military and religious goals and the answer was reform or purification - hence the expulsion of the heretical Moriscos 1609-1614 and the Sumptuary laws against dress. A national regeneration of values was undertaken.
However, a change of policy was needed to solve the economic problems. This started to take place under Zuniga and the work was continued and finally aborted under Olivares. The Junta de Reformacion was set up to reform morals and manners, municipal offices in Castile were cut by two-thirds, brothels closed and education limited. Many grandees were excluded from power in favor of the hidalgos. Fresh asientos were negotiated and royal household expenditure reduced. On the fiscal front Olivares purged the Council of Finance and La Mata was put in charge . the stranglehold of Genoa on finance was lightened by the use of Jewish and Portuguese bankers. The creation of montes de piedad and the attempted abolition of the millones were further efforts made by Olivares who set up juntas to repopulate villages, cut navigations and promote overseas trade via the Almirantazgo de los Paises Septentrionales. A Junta de Armadas was set up in an attempt to counterbalance the fragmentation of the Empire. Olivares most ambitious scheme was the 1625 Union of Arms which called upon each province to contribute to the war effort and set out quotas for the number of troops to be supplied.
However, there was a great difference between intention and the actual achievement and most of the reforms met with catastrophe but perhaps the reforming zeal of Olivares was not in vain because the Spanish monarchy was not eradicated despite the traumas of the 1640s
The Demands of Empire
Don Luis de Haro was Olivares successor and he helped to save the monarchy but it was not until the death of Philip IV in 1665 that the economic situation improved notably. For this the hand of Providence or demographic factors must take credit largely. There was an improvement in birth rates and towns such as Medina del Campo grew. There was a brutal devaluation of the vellon in 1680 and manufacturers could now make reasonable profits without inflating costs. Trade committees were set up in Seville, Valencia and Barcelona and the crown issued a decree that manufacturing was not a barrier to becoming a noble in 1682. Agricultural output even increased e.g. Segovia was exporting four times as much wool in 1700 as in 1650. The Seville monopoly on New World trade was eased in favour of Bilbao, Mataro and Barcelona.
The War of the Spanish Succession itself acted as a stimulant to domestic manufacture and helped to unify Spain and forced her to concentrate on internal economic matters if she was to survive. After the Treaty of Utrecht 1713 by which Spain was stripped of her European empire she was also freed from expensive commitments to their defence which was to her great advantage. Thus we can see how the efforts of the Spanish crown and its administration helped to retard the decline of Spain. The economic decline of Spain took so long because during the seventeenth century attempts were made to halt deterioration but more significantly the loss of territory lightened the burden on her economy and population increase aided Spain in her economic regeneration in the early years of the eighteenth century. So rather than talk of the economic decline of Spain we could talk of a recession.
Political and Military Rise and Decline
We should now move onto the second aspect of Spain's decline mentioned, namely her numerous military defeats and loss of her virtual hegemony of Europe during the seventeenth century and early years of the next century. Here there is a much more visible and marked decline than in the economic sphere. The two major component parts of Spain had been welded together by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1469. The Catholic Kings then proceeded to push the Moors out of the peninsula. The reconquest was completed by their entry into Granada in 1492 and the war was taken to Islam on the North African coast.
At the other end of the globe the Indies had been discovered which was to have such momentous consequences for Spain's future. In addition Naples fell to France and Spain in 1501 by the Treaty of Trento and was later ceded entirely to Spain. Navarre was invaded in 1512 and absorbed three years later. Set against a background of such startling success any loss of prestige or failure to fulfill Castile's potential was seen as a decline in power.
Spain's position was further enhanced by the succession of Charles V who added Burgundy, Flanders, Franche Compte and Milan and the prestige of becoming Holy Roman Emperor in 1519. The revolt of the comuneros was suppressed and when Philip succeeded him in 1556 he proceeded to increase Spain's power by the absorption of Portugal and her vast empire in 1580 after securing peace with France at the Treaty of Cateaux-Cambresis in 1659 and successfully fighting off the Ottomans.
I think it was necessary to give this brief account of Spain's political ascendency so we can judge her subsequent performance in relation to her past form. When Philip II died in 1598 Spain was undoubtedly the greatest power in Europe ( despite the defeat of the Armada and other reversals) and this is obviously one of the main reasons why the decline of Spain took so long i.e. her initial position was so strong that although she was to suffer dismemberment in the course of the next century it was not until the Treaty of the Pyrenees that she was to be replaced by France as the foremost power in Europe. I think a little more detail about Spain's military achievements, however temporary, is needed in order to explain the relatively slow decline of her empire. Despite the loss of Casale, Bois-de-Duc and Maastricht in the 1620s Spain's position was not too seriously effected. She mounted a blistering attack under Feria and Don Fernando in 1633 at the height of the Thirty Year's War was devastated the Swedes at Nordlingen in 1634 and Paris itself nearly capitulated by 1636. The money for this campaign had come from requisitions of silver, forced loans, fresh ecclesiastical taxation and imposition of taxes on salt and paper as well as a reissue of copper coinage.
Although such expedients may have been ruinous in the long run they serves the immediate needs of the crown. But also it is a remarkable fact that many armies of Spain did not mutiny despite extensive and prolonged delays in being paid. Feria's army was a prime example. Economic weakness did not necessarily always lead to military defeat. However Spain suffered real reversals in the 1640s with internal revolts in Catalonia, Portugal, Andalusia, Naples and Sicily. The Spanish Road had been terminated by the fall of Breisach and she had suffered humiliating naval defeat at the Battle of the Downs.
The decline of Spain took so long politically and militarily partly because her enemies, France in particular, failed to exploit all her weaknesses. French invasions were hampered by topographical factors and logistical problems. There was also a patriotic response to the invasion of the Spanish homelands and she never lost her grip in the western Mediterranean, Barcelona was recaptured and the revolt of the Catalans suppressed after twelve years. Although it could be argued that the outbreak of the Fronde had weakened the French and that Spain suffered defeat at Rocroi and in effect lost the Netherlands for ever she had quelled internal rebellion, Valeda had repulsed French advances in Italy and Casale had been regained which really shows that her decline was not as simple and swift as people imagine.
Spanish prestige and power, it is true, had been weakened but by the Treaty of Pyrenees in 1659 Spain lost little territory although her position as the foremost power in Europe had come to an end because of the ascendency of France. Spanish decline was a relative decline. Spain's catalogue of disasters was still not over. Portugal regained her independence in 1668 and by the Treaty of Nijmegen on 1678 Franche Compte was lost. Casale fell again in 1681 and Luxembourg followed in 1683. Again Spain experienced a slight revival and by the Peace of Rijswick in 1697 Spain regained Barcelona and Luxembourg, Mons and Coutrai. But the final liquidation of Spanish power in Europe only came with the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 after the War of the Spanish Succession by which she lost remaining Netherlands, Lombardy, Naples and Sardinia to the Emperor Charles, Gibraltar and Minorca to England along with the slave asiento, Gelderland to Prussia, Sicily to Victor Amadeus of Savoy - truly her territories had been carved up by the anti-Bourbon alliance. Although Spain may have emerged as a more compact , cohesive and unified state after 1713 no one would deny the eclipse of her power. As I hope I have shown the decline was postponed due to a wide variety of factors from periodic revivals in military operations, failure of the enemy to exploit her weaknesses and finally in the War of Spanish Succession by the assistance of France.
Conclusion
In conclusion it is relatively easy to point to the reasons for Spain's decline but much harder to account for the speed of decline. I believe that Spain may have in fact merely suffered from recessions as far as economics are concerned but she certainly suffered from irreversible if not inexorable decline militarily and politically. The demands of Empire in fact weighed heavily on Spain it seems. Other themes such as the deteriorating quality of the monarchs and the role of religion have been omitted because although I can see their relevance in a discussion about the decline of Spain I can see no simple evidence that either factor retarded or sped that decline. The almost complete religious uniformity of Spain under the Inquisition may have provided a solidarity in the face of the heretic but even this simply led to costly interventions and inflexible policy which resulted in the loss of power - in particular in the Netherlands conflict. The decline of Spain took so long partly because the economic criteria of that decline improved after the general economic crisis of the early seventeenth century and politically the moribund empire was bolstered periodically from within and by powers such as England who wished to maintain some balanbce of power on the continent. Finally Spain's geography can not be ignored. The briefest glance at the map will show clearly that the Pyrenees and the Mediterranean and Atlantic formed ramparts against the invader. Even if they were occasionally breached and the rest of the empire was geographically indefensible the heartland of Castile was reasonably secure - another factor accounting for the long slow decline of Spain militarily rather than an overnight collapse. Essentially the economic expansion of Spain (real to the 1590s, though very shallowly based and itself related to population growth) could not keep pace with the demands being made on it by the claims of Empire.
