subject: POST-ELECTION CRISIS IN KENYA AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL [print this page] POST-ELECTION CRISIS IN KENYA AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
INTRODUCTION
The announcement of the disputed 2007 presidential Kenya elections results on December 27th, 2007 led to what could be described as the worst political crisis in her history. This massacre claimed over 1,000 lives of children, men, and women, and left around 600,000 Kenyans internally displaced (Obonyo, 2008). The immediate and remote causes of the crisis have been analyzed by authors. Thus, it is argued that the violence and displacement began with the establishment of multi-party politics in the 1990s and it took different forms in different parts of the country. Although exacerbated by political feuds, the violence had its roots in ethnic rivalries and struggle for ancestral lands. The internal feud had been brewing for decades and the election results were the catalyst and immediate cause that finally ignited the conflict. (Obonyo, 2008; Bayne, 2008). This essay undertakes a cause-effect analysis of the conflict with focus on the internal and global responses to Internally Displaced Persons'.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF KENYA VIOLENCE.
Historically, it can be said that violence is entrenched in Kenya due to many factors: the socio-political and economic structure of the country. Social relations between the two main ethnic groups the Kalenjis and the Kikuyus had been frosty since pre-colonial days and the demand for, and control of scarce arable land often resulted in conflict. This acrimonious relationship has constantly undergone generational shifts metamorphosing of course, but never really going away.
The introduction of multi-party politics in the 1990 rekindled this age-old rivalry and provided new frontiers for its manifestations. "Kenya's political landscape is marked by party zones, as each party's supports and affiliation tends to be concentrated in particular geographical areas. Such support, especially among opposition parties, is ethnically specific, except in urban areas and other multi-ethnic societies". (Kamungi, 2001). It was observed that the clashes in 1992 affected more than 300,000 people and left thousands of people displaced. Thus, throughout the 1990s, there was recurrent violence traceable to political wrangling, ethnic animosity, unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, ignorance, poor security system and a general lack of political will to address the root causes of the violence and displacement.
It is to be expected that with such violent history in the not too distant past, memories of the 1992 crisis served as a reminder of the ethnic tension underlying Kenya's political process as the 2007 elections drew near. For example, as far back as 1993, it was observed that violent struggles over land characterize Kenya political life (Human Rights Watch, 1997). The announcement of Kenya December, 2007 parliamentary elections brought about disagreements between the parties involved when Kibaki was re-elected as president and this resulted in communal clashes which claimed over 1,000 deaths and over 600,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). This has been described as the worst political violence in Kenya's history as the 2007 post election crises was characterized by inhumane killings of fellow human beings, abuse of women and children especially girls. This was a period when the rule of law and human rights were seen as alien to the citizens as many Kenyans decided to trample rights and freedom with impunity (Obonyo, 2008).
The pattern of violence was complex and different in every parts of the country. All kinds of violence characterized this period e.g. spontaneous violence (e.g. Orange Democratic Movement attack on Kikuyus and PNU supporters in Rift Valley, Nairobi slums, Nyanza, and Mombasa) organized attacks (e.g. 29-30 December and 24 January ethnic violence at Rift Valley, Nakuru and Naivasha between Kalenjin warriors and Kikuyus led by Mungiki), and gender based violence (e.g. rape and forced circumcision of males from Luo and Luhya communities), (Bayne, 2007).
CAUSES OF THE VIOLENCE
Kenya 2007 post-election violence is rooted in the ethnic dispute between Kalejins and Kikuyus and was fuelled by the results of December 2007 elections. Kalenjis believe that the kikuyus have marginalized them for far too long by dominating the major sectors of the economy of the country at their own expense. The immediate cause of the violence was the announcement of the elections results while there are other inherent factors that contributed to the violence. The causes of the violence are:
Electoral violence: It is worthy to note the magnitude of the Kenya violence of 1992 and 1997 multi-party general elections that drew national and international concern. This same political violence repeated itself in year 2007 general elections. It has been observed that Kenya violence does come every 5 years (Otieno, 2008). Kenya 2007 post-election started after the former president Kibaki was re-elected as the president but the opposition party(ODM) felt the election was manipulated and this unleashed a violent reaction from ODM supporters against the Kikuyus and PNU supporters. There were cases of large scale-burning, looting, killing and maiming.
A feature of the violence was that it happened wherever the majority of ODM supporters were present (e.g. Rift Valley, Nyanza, Nairobi slums and Mombasa) and this was directed by groups of youth (Bayne, 2008). It was argued that Kenya violence was about controlling the state (Landau et al 2009).
Land disputes: Kenya land problems dates far back to pre-colonial period when powerful communities acquired the land of the less-privileged through conquest. It was a period like the Hobbesian state of nature where the most powerful takes all; the powerful groups dominated the weaker ones and appropriated the resources particularly grazing lands. That system of economic relationship endured the colonial period and the perceived injustices and deprivations manifest themselves in recurring circle of violence throughout the country. These dispossessed communities continued to exist on the fringe of the economic arrangements even to this day. For example, much of the organized violence at Rift Valley was caused by the land dispute because Rift Valley was occupied by pastoralists, while the central highlands were occupied by the Kikuyu and other communities involved in agricultural activities.
The allocation of land after independence was disproportionate and marginalized certain ethnic groups. The Kalenjins in particular felt that they had been schemed out in the land redistribution exercise and reacted violently displacing many Kikuyus in the process. The kalenjins were of the view that the Kikuyus were allocated someof their fertile lands and the kalenjins promised to return to majimbo constitution in order to uprootthe Kikuyus and reclaim their ancestral lands. Kenya land problem is politically oriented and fuelled the 2007 post-election violence because one ethnic group wants other to move out. It has been argued that since 1990s certain leaders have exploited ethnic grievances over perceived historical injustices' (Bayne, 2008). It has also been argued that a struggle over land has always been the characteristic of Kenya political life (Landau et al 2009). The land dispute also reflected in the 1992 and the 1997 violence, this indicates that the quest for land control is central to the political life of Kenya.
Ethnicity and ethnic animosity: This factor is a corollary of the foregoing and was one of the major causes of the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya. What began as a reaction to a fraudulent election soon transformed into ethnic violence because there were discriminations in allocation of resources based on ethnicity. The effect of this can also be seen in some countries in Africa e.g. Burundi and Rwanda. The demonization of other in Kenya led to heated violence between the ethnic groups especially the Kalenjins and Kikuyus. Just like the dispute between Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda and Burundi respectively, politicians in Kenya politicized the existing differences between the ethnic groups and this led to the violence that occurred at Rift Valley, Western, and Coast Provinces.
It has been argued that "ethnic loyalty and coherence has been a central feature to Kenyan politics since independence. Control of the state is core to political competition because it means access to and disposal of resources, and patronage through which ethnic elites can remain in power" (Kamungi, 2001). This is evidenced in the differences between different ethnic groups where the Gikuyu Embu Meru Association (GEMA) tribes occupy the most productive areas of the country during the Kenyatta regime while the Kalenjin Maasai Turkana Samburu Association (KAMATUSA) occupied the less productive area. Also, Kalenjin tribe accumulated so much power during the reign of Arap Moi. Kenyans were made have grown accustomed to a fact of their national life that some ethnic groups are superior to others and thus should have better deals in the social, economic and political equation of the country. The resulting inequity and injustice, frustration and animosity are what have haunted Kenya every other few years in the form of violent conflicts.
Economic and political inequality: Belonging to the superior and government favoured ethnic tribes gives one an edge over the less privileged tribes in accessing the political and economic resources of the country. Economic and political inequalities were one of the major causes of the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya and this depended on the regime in power. It was observed that Kikuyu and Central Province had been enjoying the economic and political resources of Kenya before and after independence at the expense other regions or tribes (Stewart, 2008). The attempt to correct the economic and political differences of Kikuyu over the Kalenjin and Luo resulted in violence. Since economic and political dominance of one group over others often results in violence because of feeling of marginalization by the less-privileged group, Kenya had at all material time been a time bomb waiting to explode and had only had, what may, at best be described as a lull or an uneasy peace.
Media: Although, some media house played a positive role by calling for peace but some indigenous and vernacular media houses fuelled the ethnic tensions by encouraging violent acts especially at the height of the violence.
Impunity: It has been argued that impunity characterize some of the African countries political life (Landau et al 2009; Ellis, 1994). This is very true of Kenya as much as many other African countries experiencing political transition from authoritarian or dictatorial regimes to multi-party democracy. Impunity characterizes the political scene of Kenya since the establishment of multi-party system in the 1990s and this has encouraged violence during elections. The inability of the government to hold accountable the perpetrators of the 1990s violence under the regime of president Kibaki despite the indictment of many senior politicians bred a culture of impunity in Kenya's political violence history. This act of impunity encouraged some politicians to incite violence, manipulate electoral process without ever being prosecuted. This act of impunity was thus repeated all over again in 2007 election hence, the post-election violence we witnessed.
Class war: The level of vandalism that occurred during 2007 post-election in Kenya could be described as class war. There is wide margin between the rich and the poor in Kenya. Unemployment, illiteracy, and impoverishment have caused many youth to engage in crimes and violence. The active involvement of youth could be seen in Kenya 2007 post-election violence as a reflection of the harsh socio-economic conditions of many youths who were involved directly in the incitement of violence with politicians and vandalization of properties.
EFFECTS OF THE VIOLENCE
The consequences of 2007 Kenya post-election violence's cannot be underestimated. These violence claimed more than 1,000 lives like those that occurred in 1990s but its effects by displacing hundreds of thousands of people was more than the displacement that occurred in the 1990s. I shall briefly discuss the consequences but I will focus on the case of IDPs. The consequences include the following:
Population displacement: 2007 post-election violence left hundreds of thousands of people displaced or uprooted from their home or place of habitual residence. The Kenyan violence was characterized by ethnic conflicts and this led to massive removal or uproot of some tribes. For instance, the kalenjins attack of Kikuyus and PNU supporters at the Rift Valley and other places after the announcement of 2007 presidential elections and this caused members of the attacked group to move. This kind of displacement also occurred in the violent clashes of the 1990s and not all the displaced persons have been able to go back home since then.
Underdevelopment: There cannot be meaningful development where insecurity is the order of the day. Disorderliness and threat to life and resources because of the violence hinders development. This is not only an effect, but in turn becomes a causative factor in the continuing circle of chaos and anarchy.
Militarization of society: There were so much of firearms due to the ethnic and the political violence and possession of firearms hindered the conflict management. The possession of firearms by communities and different ethnic groups encourage violence.
Poverty, crime, and other social ills followed the post-election violence. There were beggars, thieves, and prostitutes before the violence but the situation has worsened since the violence.
I now turn to the humanitarian responses and human rights violations of the displaced people in Kenya 2007 post-election violence.
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSES TO INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE IN KENYA
The forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Kenyans in the wake of the 2007 post-election violence was a serious challenge to the disaster management capacity of the Kenyan Government. The violence left the country with around 600,000 displaced people. The issue of the resettlement of the displaced has brought a heated debate between the government, civil societies and the displaced people. Unlike the 1990s unresponsiveness to the plight of the displaced people, the government of Kenya responded to 2007 post-election displaced people through her Ministry of Special Programmes with Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS) as partner. Though, there were some faith-based and relief organizations ready to assist the IDPs but continuous increase in the number of IDPs made them handicapped.
The government of Kenya and KRCS were supported by some NGOs and international organizations e.g. UN, in order to meet the needs of the displaced and to plan their resettlement after the violence. Kenyan government asked those displaced by violence to return to their homes and was at a point given 100 days ultimatum to return to their homes and farms. This forced order given by the government needs further clarification and it has been argued that " given the complex issues surrounding IDPs such an arbitrary deadline is unproductive and could potentially lead to pressure for involuntary return, raising protection concerns, and may even re-ignite localized violence"(Bayne, 2008). The implication of this is that Kenyan government was trying to use force without due regard to the safety of the IDPs. In the first place, the movement was involuntary and if the people are to return, it should be voluntary and government should encourage rather than coerce this. For instance, there was a report that each time the Kikuyus at Rift Valley made advance back to their homes, the Kalenjin youths did tell them to go back and threaten to kill them (Kamugi, 2008).
I argue that the government ought to address the causes of the violence and ensure the security of those displaced. With the research conducted, it was discovered that many displaced fear to return home because of the insincerity of the government in providing adequate security for them (Refugee Review Tribunal, 2008). Despite the programmes put in place by government, resettlement of the IDPs did not work because the government fails to recognize the causes of the violence e.g. the inequality and mutual antagonism amongst the ethnic groups. The failure of government to reconcile the ethnic disputes still threatens the voluntary resettlement of the IDPs till date.
Kenyan government announcement concerning the closure of IDPs camps also made these people especially woman and children vulnerable to all kinds of abuses and diseases. It was on this note that the UN emergency Relief Coordinator, John Holmes maintained that the situation in Kenya has turned to a humanitarian crisis because Kenya's Minister for Special Programmes ordered the closure of IDP camps with offer for foods for the IDPs but no assurance on their security. Similarly, Walter Kalin, the UN Secretary-General's Representative on the Human Rights of IDPs expressed worries over the role of the international community and national authorities to give credence to the choice of IDPs to freely choose where they wanted to live (Otieno, 2008).
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST IDPs IN KENYA POST-ELECTIONS VIOLENCE.
It is worthy of note that Kenya 2007 post-election violence left hundreds of thousands of people displaced. Some had gone back to their homes or the communities where they had ethnic or political affinity, while some are still wandering around despite the resettlement plans of the government to provide for them after the declaration of the government to close all IDPs camps. I argue that despite the plans of Kenyan governments to resettle the IDPs, the human rights violations involved cannot be overlooked.
Although, there is no regime guiding the affairs of the internally displaced persons but the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement identify rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of IDPs during displacement and resettlement (OCHA, 1998). Just like every other human being, the internally displaced people have fundamental human rights and it is the responsibility of the Kenyan government to take care of her citizens. It was observed that this right was compromised by Kenyan authorities after losing the control of the state or territory to rebels or militia groups (e.g. Kalenjin warriors) where part of the population was being victimized as enemy of the state (Bayne, 2008; Kamunji, 2000).
Unlike the refugees that are guided under the 1951 Convention, 1967 Protocols and OAU 1969 Convention, there is no regime or Convention binding on the IDPs but United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been given the mandate to extend humanitarian assistance to the IDPs mostly on request of the country involved. But the intervention from international community could be less or absent where political violence caused the displacement in the country. This is due to the principle of non-intervention in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter that gives respect to territorial integrity of such country (Barnett, 2002; Mackintosh, 2000). Therefore, the rights of the IDPs can be subjected or open to abuse since there is no law or convention binding on the government or any institution involved in the case of IDPs in Kenya. It is in this regard that it was argued that:
"The importance of rapid and timely action by the government to
reduce vulnerability of IDPs to rape and other forms of sexual and
gender-based violence cannot be overstated. A June 2007 report by
the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre of the Norwegian
Refugee Council to the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women had noted that the rights of Kenya's
women and girl IDPs were being violated, although they are protected
under CEDAW- which Kenya ratified in 1984. And a UN-NGO report
released in March 2008 highlighted the dramatic increase in rape and
sexual abuse during and since post-election violence" (Otieno, 2008).
The above statement shows that the IDPs suffer the kind of human right abuses that are similar to those of refugees. The forced displacements of the Kenya IDPs pose the human rights questions as to the free movement of those internally displaced to choose where they want to live or reside.
There are many other rights that are infringed by forced displacement identified in Kenya post-election violence (Refugee Review Tribunal, 2008; IRIN, 2008; Chicago Tribune, 2008; Bayne, 2008; Otieono, 2008; Kamungi, 2000&2001). These rights are listed below:
Violation of security rights: The feeling of insecurity was pervasive and this was because of the failure of the government to provide safety for its citizens which gave some of the IDPs no hope of going back home. It impunity, it is said, characterize some African countries' political life (Landau et al 2009; Ellis, 1994).
Violation of right to education: The violence disrupts the education of students. In North Rift, 35 primary schools closed as people moved due to the violence and the schools in South Rift refused to take the children of IDPs.
Violation of right to adequate housing: People were forced to move out of their habitual residence due to the violence and this led to the encampment of large numbers of people into small structures causing congestions, overcrowding etc with the potential danger of outbreaks of and spread of diseases.
Violation of the right to own property: Many houses were burnt, looted and vandalized during the violence and left so many people homeless.
Lack of access to legal aid
The ill treatment of IDPs: The rights of displaced people were not respected especially by the police because they were often arrested and tortured.
Discrimination: Some of the displaced people were discriminated against because of the political affiliation of their communities in Kenya. Some tribes were associated with particular political parties and these were enough grounds for discrimination.
Child labour: IDPs and their children were used as source of cheap labour by agricultural companies.
CONCLUSION
The 1990s and 2007 Kenya post-election violence led to the displacement of so many people both young and old including children without proper resettlement for these people. The inability of the government to address the key issues e.g. security, and the threat posed by tribal militias against others made some displaced people too scared to return. This is violation of their right to return to their homes. Besides, the response of the government to the plight of the displaced was grossly inadequate and did not meet the minimum needs of the internally displaced persons. Finally, the gross violations of human rights of the Internally Displaced Persons should not be left unaddressed.
