The M/V was travelling northbound on the Mississippi River through the St. Louis Harbor. It struck the Missouri-side pier of the center span of the Eads Bridge. Eight barges broke away and drifted back through the Missouri span. Three of these barges drifted toward the President Casino on the Admiral. This was a permanently moored gaming vessel below the bridge on the Missouri side of the river. The three drifting barges struck the moored Admiral. Its mooring lines broke. The Admiral drifted away from the Missouri riverbank. The captain of the Anne Holly disengaged his vessel from the remaining barges in the tow and placed the Anne Holly's bow against the Admiral's bow to hold it against the bank. No one died in the accident, but 50 people had minor injuries. 16 of them were sent to local hospitals for treatment.
The NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board) reported that about 19:50 on April 4, 1998, the tow of 12 loaded and 2 empty barges, could not overcome the current and thus struck the Missouri-side pier of the centre-span of the Eads Bridge. The current caused eight barges to break away and drift back down the Missouri. 3 of 8 drifting barges struck the moored Admiral, causing 8 of its 10 mooring lines to break. The captain of the Anne Holly saw that, but could not prevent the Admiral from rotaiton downriver. The captain of the Anne Holly freed his vessel from the six remaining barges in the tow. He placed the Anne Holly so that it could hold the Admiral against the bank. It was timely, and the Admiral's last mooring line remained attached to the Admiral's stem anchor, which held the Admiral near the Missouri bank.
According to the chief engineer, the captain asked him to set the fuel rack to provide the maximum engine power before the Anne Holly got near the bridges. The engineer complied with the request, and the captain made no comments about inadequate engine power. When the tow was approaching Eads Bridge, the captain said he used visual arks lights of the Eads and Mar Luth King Bridge and other visual points. He said he maneuvered the Anne Holly close to the middle of the arched centre span because the arch appex could best accommodate the towboat's height. Also, the captain testified that when 300 to 400 feet of the tow had passed under the Eads bridge, he could feel the tow begin to slow. He continued to use the vessel's full power to move the tow throught the bridge, he said. The complete tow, including the 154-foot-long towboat, was 1,149 feet long and 105 feet wide.
Evaluation
In this part of the report, we are discussing the accident as the captain, the passers-by, the fire department, the police, those who heard the radio transmissions and the personnels of different marine vessels saw it. Quick responses of everyone involved in the accident led to the result that all emergency actions were made promptly, and no deaths occurred.
The captain said it was the current that halted the tow's forward movement and impeded the tow's forward progress. The captain said that even the maximum engine power could not overcome the current in the bridge span. Then, the current made the tow drift sideways toward the shore. Within 30 seconds, the tow's port side struck the pier of the Eads bridge. After that, eight of the 12 loaded barges broke away and drifted back down the Missouri River. The captain said he attempted to call the Admiral when three of the drifting barges started to drift toward the 380-foot-long President Casino on the Admiral, but the Admiral did not have a radio. Happily the master on watch on another M/V, Casino Queen, overheard the attempts to contact the Admiral.
Four minutes after the barges broke away, at 19:54, the struck Admiral began moving offshore, and its electrical, natural gas, telephone, and water service lines parted about. The captain of the Anne Holly was told about the drifting on the telephone by the master on watch of the Casino Queen. Five minutes after the Admiral began drifting, at 19:59, captain of Anne Holly placed the Anne Holly's bow against the Admiral's bow to keep it near the bank. Two minutes before this, at 19:57, President Casino's personnel notified the emergency. The SLFD team arrived in 8 minutes, at 20:05, to find the Admiral stabilized against the bank. The police was notified even earlier, and they arrived at 20:00. The fire department assisted in evacuation from the Admiral to the Anne Holly, and later to shore. They provided the bridge from the Admiral to the Anne Holly, and the evacuating boat. The whole process lasted about three and a half hours. During the evacuation process, all the 14 the drifting barges were being retrieved and secured to fleeting areas, too. Seven towboats from various fleeting areas heard the transmissions form the Anne Holly about the loose barges. They completed the work an hour after the pier was struck at 20:50.
The SLFD that came on the scene were ready to fight a fire with five machines, to rescue people with 18 rescue squads, and to take the injured in 15 ambulances to hospitals. All in all, there were 48 units with 65 people from the SLFD.
The Coast Guard's actions were taken after it was notified about the accident at 20:00. they closed two miles of the river and three bridges at 20:14, but the bridges were reopened in two minutes. The Eads was reopened, too.
The river remained closed to traffic, however, because the Coast Guard were told that a person might have fallen into the water. With the Cheyenne, three patrol boats,and the police helicopter, no one was found in the water. The search ended at 23:10. After about two hours the river was opened to light traffic, and at 09:30 on April 5, the river was open to all traffic.
Two M/Vs who asisted in evacuation were the Becky Thatcher and the Tom Sawyer. They offloaded 927 and 787 people from the Admiral correspondingly. The Tom Sawyer had been moored at the Gateway Bridge before the evacuation, while the Becky Thatcher had to disembark its passengers before it came to the Admiral's location.
When the power supply line was torn apart because of the Admiral's drifting, a blackout occurred in a few downtown buildings and a garage. The technicians managed to restore power by 22:00, more than two hours after the blackout. All this time, the Admiral had lights on due to emergency generators that started to supply emergency electrical power within five secodns after the blackout.
Natural gas leak was a more potentially dangerous situation. The fire department, on arriving, started to pour water on the escaping gas so that no explosion could happen. Soon they contacted the Laclede Gas Company that came on the scene at 21:05. the team had difficulty stopping the gas flow because the valves were unaccessible in the muddy river water. Somehow they managed to put a clamp on the gas hose supplied by the fire department.
There were 10 people with him on board the AnneHolly. The Admiral had more than 2000 people on board, 250 of whom were the staff. While the damage to the Anne Holly was less than half a million dollars, damages to the Admiral were estimated at $10 to $11 million. Nine of the 14 Anne Holly's barges were undamaged. The Admiral received damage to the upper bow, and besides, its water, power, and gas supplies had to be restored. The bridge did not get damaged, only a little scraped.
Conclusions of the Investigating Team
The investigators found that no electrical or mechanical malfunction occurred during the accident on board the Anne Holly. The captain was charged with negligence, and this was the first record against him during his 25-year-work at vessels, mostly as an operator. He was charged because no weather conditions or anomalous river conditions could have been the cause of the accident. The words of the captain that it ahd been an upsurge that his towboat encountered at the Eads river were not confirmed by the data provided by the USACE. The captain had three choices to be free of neglect: to remain in the fleeting area until daylight, to untie some of the barges and travel half-empty, or to get a helper boat.
The Anne Holly was tested for its reliability 4 days after the accident, on April 8, 1998. it had 15 barges, 14 of which were cargoed. The Safety Board that conducted the testing concluded that no particular measures have to be taken to make the towboats safer in terms of their construction. The trip along the same passage of the river was successful.
The records measuring water flow and water rising did not show anything unusual that night. The water rose and the current increased as usual. That month, 27 tows similar to the Anne Holly passed the Eads without any problem at nighttime. During the 11 years from 1989 to 1998, almost 50 accidents or breakaways happened in that area in St. Louis Harbor. Nearly half of them happened in high water.
The captain was asked for recommendations regarding the accidents of such kind. He said that in this season traffic should be forbidden at night. Accordingly, in 2000 the Marine Safety Office advised the Safety Board that when the water rises 30 feet and more, night traffic should not be allowed, except for certain vessels supplied with helper boats. Note that on April 4, 1998, the water stage was more than 31 feet.
The collision of the drifting barges called for other questions. The Marine Safety Office issued a regulation supported by evidence and statistics that such permanently moored vessels (PMVs) as the Admiral should be thoroughly examined before they are qualified as PMVs, and besides, they should be located in safer areas. The statistical data revealed that of 250 accidents with PMVs in that area, most of these accidents happened due to breakaways, collisions within half a mile, or high water.
The Admiral's crew drew lessons from what happened. They obtained a heavier anchor, bought two cell phones for emergency, and istalled the marine radio for the employee to listen to it 24 hours a day and 7 days a week. Besides, the staff went through a training for emergency situations.
The Safety Board were concerned with other things, however. Had the Admiral caught a fire, would everyone survive if the evecuation process tookmore than three hours? The gangways should be available and free from danger on any vessel like the Admiral, and besides, the personnel should be trained on how to cunduct quick evacuation in case of fire, flood, severe winds, and strikes by vessels.
Likewise, the cause for such lengthy evacuation was the fire depart,emt. Though it arrived on the scene on time, they had no equipment to provide the evacuation in case the gangways were unavailable. The Safety Board advised the city to ensure that they develop plans for evacuation together with PMV management.
The Safety Board also evaluated the operation of the Coast Guard. Their plan was good in terms of actions to be taken in case of an accident, but it did not anticipate the accidents of such kind as the collision of the barge with the Admiral. If had, they would be able to prepare the equipment for successful response. The Safety Board recommended the Coast Guard to work out and exercise different marine scenarios to prevent and cope with accidednts that could have evolved had the Anne Holly not held back the Admiral from drifting. Since then, the Coast Guard has developed a discipline dapproach to assessing risks.
The gas company, Laclede, restored gas supplies to the Admiral, and besides, it made the necessary modification of the gas lines to the four other PMVs along the shore to get ready access to them in case of emergency. But the Safety Board were concerned that it took about three hours for the workers to stop the leak. They expect corrective actions in relation to PMVs on the part of all gas companies.
Another company involved was the managing company that sent the Anne Holly along the river. It is a small business company, AM (American Milling), whose business is towing operations. It contracts for boats and operators burdening the operators with all the decision-making, because no special safety meassures are provided by this company. The company does not have policies as to the safe towing operations of the captain. The captain did not receive the necessary safety precautions from the towing company, and the investigation by the Safety Board led to a conclusion that AM should work out a policy of effective safety management. The Safety Board expressed its concern that AM and many similar companies are not AWO (American Waterway Operators) members and cannot benefit from the provisions of this organization. Another change that evolved from the investigation was a new requirement for postaccident for alcohol and drug testing. Tests for alcohol should be taken within 2, and for drugs within 4 hours after a serious marine accident. The Safety Board also decided to make research into whether a person suffers from fatigue when his 8-hour a day sleep time is split into two periods of 4 hours. The results of the research would be useful for implementing the best work and rest schedule for marine workers.
Recommendations
From the above-written analysis, or conclusions of the investigating team, a set of recommendations has to follow to the state and city authorities, to the Coast Guard, to the owner of the entertaining business on the Admiral, to the gas company, and to the emergency department. The only recommendation to the AM company was to see to it that we enhance the safety of vessel operations. For it, they should work out a safety management plan. Our opinion is different, though. The implementation of the safety management system on their part cannot ensure that the vessels are operated correctly. The reason for that is, partly, that they are not under constant surveillance. But that is another psychological theme. Another significant reason is a psychological problem that many experienced people encounter with. It is an unjustified sense of safety which makes them act as usual and overlook a potential danger. A feeling of safety may prompt an experienced captain into challenging actions. How many times in his life, for example, did the captain of the Anne Holly take measures recommended by the Safety Board, namely, stay overnight in the fleeting area, take along a helper boat, or disembark half of its barges halfway? Very few times, if ever. And this is not the issue of the terms of delivery. This is the issue of psychology. It is believed to be a commonplace that "the importance of experience in a profession. Because the non-routine nature of the problems of practice cannot be solved on the basis of packaged, solutions, experience that has been reflected upon becomes the basis for professional actions."
References:
Marine Accident Report, NTSB, Washington DC, 20594 http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2000/MAR0001.pdf.
Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, James Reason, Ashgate
Port and Waterways Risk Assessment Guide, J.R. Harrald, T.A. Mazuchi, J.R. van Dorp and J.E. Spahn, http://www.seas.gwu.edu/~dorpjr/tab4/publications_technical.html
Port Risk Management, Additional Federal Guidance, March 2007 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07412.pdf
Ports and Waterways Safety Assessment Workshop Guide, Coast Guard Headquarters Office of Vessel Traffic Management, 04/27/07, http://www.uscg.mil/vtm/pawsa/WorkshopGuide/GuideSelf.doc
House of Cards, Robin Dawes, the Free Press, 1994 http://www.ipt-forensics.com/journal/volume6/j6_2_br5.htm
Educational Psychology, David Berliner, Arizona State University, 2003 http://www.umanitoba.ca/publications/cjeap/articles/miscellaneousArticles/berliner.html
