subject: To what extent did the nucleur arms race make the world a more dangerous place between 1949-62? [print this page] To what extent did the nucleur arms race make the world a more dangerous place between 1949-62?
In 1949 the USSR tested there own atomic bomb ending the American nucleur monopoly, tensions were raised due to events in Europe and Indo-china, such as the Berlin crisis and the Korean War. The arms race arguably made the world a more dangerous place through the tests of brinkmanship' in the Cuban missile crisis. The increased spending, in order to impress the third world', leading to new delivery systems, such as the ICBM's in 1957 developed by the russians, making the threat of nucleur arms a more realstic one, not to mention the destructive power of the new H-bomb and Lithium bomb. However, the arms race acted as a strong deterent through promise of 'Mutually Assured Destruction', Korean War armistice in 1953 being a prime example of this, as fear of the conventional war escalating into nucleur conflict was rife amongst leaders. As well as the evident co-operation between the antagonists, such as Kruschev's visit to the USA in 1959, and the first meeting since Potsdam of the world leader's in 1955, at the Geneva Summit, and the subsequent uplifted hopes of the Geneva spirit'.
Both sides saw the arms race as a perfect opportunity to show the power of their political system. As well as show there advancement in terms of economy and impose this on the so called third world', the side with the most extensive arsenal, or most powerful weapons was the stronger, therefore the most appealing. This opportunity however posed a great threat to world security as in 1949, the US nucleaur monopoly was ended by the soviets, who tested there own atomic bomb. Followed by the even more destructive lithium bomb exploded by the soviets in 1953. Eisenhower's election campaign had been based on dismissal of Truman's soft' approach to communism. As well as Dulles who was a hardline anti-communist, these two together, whilst understanding the dangers of nucleur war, were also more than willing to go to the brink of war. For example in Quemoy in 1954 where Dulles threatened the Chinese with nucleur weapons, this was a very high risk strategy and one that was to be maintained, most noticably in the Cuban missile crisis where Kennedy tested Brinkmanship' to new limits. The delivery systems were constantly being evolved, the B-52, the USA's own intercontinental bomber was made in retaliation to the TU-20 bear, Russia's bomber in 1956 which made the prospect of nucleur weapons actually being dropped on US territory more of a realisitc one. Furthermore the Russians ICBM's in 1957, which in corroboration with the launching of Sputnik, created a real fear in the USA of the so called Bomber gap', first mentioned to Eisenhower through the CIA's Gaither report in 1957. Danger arose mainly out of fear, this fear was used as a means of boasting and bluffing, US spy planes found Kruschev was lieng about his nucleur superiority in 1958, but arguably this so called detterent' was really only limited. The suspense and pressures put on new president Kennedy for example, and Kruschev's pressure from the newly allied Chinese that he was being too friendly with the Americans all add up, and arguably it was only a matter of time before one side cracked. Both sides wanted to establish their blocs in order to ease this insecurity, NATO formed in 1949 and the Warsaw Pact of 1955, are clear evidence of the times.
However the promise of mutually assured destruction was the perfect detterent, and the threat of nucleaur war was to be the grounds for peaceful co-existence, as imposed by Kruschev in his secret speech in 1953. The Korean war armistice of 1953, was evidence that this fear of conventional war escalating to nucleur war was rife, the subsequent summit in 1955 of the superpowers, was evidence that negotiation was being made, Eisenhower pushed for open skies' policy whilst Kruschev wanted a reduction in arms. This however tied in with Eisenhowrs idea of more bang for the buck', the idea that less nucleur weapons should be produced, instead more powerful ones. Which makes it less valid in physcially securing world peace, but in terms of better communication, this marked a renewed sense of safety as both sides were aware that nuclear conflict was the last option and by far the one that need be avoided at all costs. Kruschev also visited the USA in 1959, which marked better relations, although tension was still high when he was denied access to disneyland on health and safety grounds, resulting in him accusing the US of having missile launch pads there. Furthermore, in a conversation he said we will bury you', whilst he was only talking of Economic goals, in times of nucleur tension these words were not well received. Whilst it is argued the risks of using nucleur weapons as a bargaining tool, or discussing the dangers of brinkmanship, it can also be argued, that these methods did make the world safer. The Quemoy and Matsu crisis in 1955 was quickly resolved through threat of nucleur conflict, which is evidence, that Dulles and Eisenhower's nucleaur policy, wasn't just an empty rhetoric. Although Brinkmanship was tested in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, it can be argued that had nucleur war not been a detterent, then conventional warfare may have been innevitable resulting in a world war III. A Europe which was even more unstable, due to the establishment of communist and capatalist blocs not being cemented.
The idea of mutually assured destruction was the perfect detterent of nucleur conflict. The arms race was, in my view, a political tool manipulated by different leaders to establish themselves in a very unstable post war world. The military industrial complex in the USA being a prime example of how the arms race was benificial for the US economy, the boasting of Kruschev in order to show that he would stand strong against imperialism. The arms race established two blocs and made both sides wearier of one another, leading to co-operation through fear, the Geneva and Vienna summit's being examples of this. Whilst for example the Cuban missile crisis undeniably made the world stand still, and understandably made the world feel more dangerous, the probabilty of all out war wouldv'e been much higher had the nucleur weapons not been the detterent. Further evidence of detterence in action, was the Hungarian uprising of 1956, as well as Korean War armistice in 1953. Eisenhower, Kennedy, Molotov and Dulles all knew that concessions needed to be made to one a nother, in order to ensure the survival of mankind, through containment of the destructive powers of nucleur weapons.
