subject: California Los Angeles County Charged Driving Stolen Vehicle Misdemeanor Peremptory Writ Lawyers Attorneys [print this page] LINDA RIVERA MEDELLIN, Petitioner, vLINDA RIVERA MEDELLIN, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest
Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division One
March 7, 1985
A complaint filed in the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles Judicial District charged petitioner in count I with driving or taking a vehicle without consent of the owner, a felony; in count II with driving a vehicle under the combined influence of an alcoholic beverage and a drug, a misdemeanor; in count III with use and being under the influence of a controlled substance, phencyclidine (PCP), a misdemeanor. At the preliminary hearing, the evidence presented showed a California Highway Patrol Officer observed petitioner driving a stolen automobile and petitioner admitted knowing the vehicle was stolen. No evidence was presented with respect to the two misdemeanor offenses. Petitioner was held to answer on all three counts by information filed in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Petitioner moved to set aside the information pursuant to Penal Code section 995. Among the grounds for the motion was the contention she was committed without reasonable or probable cause on counts II and III, inasmuch as no evidence was presented as to those offenses. The motion was denied. Petitioner then filed with this court a petition for writ of prohibition; the petition was denied. She petitioned the California Supreme Court for a hearing. The California Supreme Court ordered the appellate court to issue an alternative writ of prohibition to respondent trial court to show cause why a peremptory writ should not issue restraining it from proceeding with petitioner criminal defendant's trial on two misdemeanor counts of a three count information. Petitioner had sought the writ on the ground she was committed without reasonable or probable cause.
Whether the misdemeanor offenses are joined with felony offenses for trial in superior court?
Whether the petitioner is eligible for the peremptory writ of prohibition?
The Court noted that the Misdemeanor offenses are generally tried in inferior courts and are prosecuted by written complaint. Felonies are tried in superior court and prosecuted by indictment or information. If by information, there must be a preliminary examination of the case by a magistrate and an order holding the defendant to answer if it appears a public offense has been committed and there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof. The fact defendant may have to wait twice as long before trial begins if she is tried in superior court on misdemeanor charges may justify allowing her the added procedural safeguards of a preliminary examination and a finding of probable cause before she is held over for trial. Additionally, the Penal Code sections setting forth the procedures to be followed prior to trial in superior court are not limited to felony prosecutions. Section 737 requires that all public offenses triable in the superior court must be prosecuted by indictment or information; it is not specifically limited to felonies although, inasmuch as section 954 has been interpreted to allow joinder of misdemeanor and felony charges for trial in superior court, such a limitation might have been made had that been the intent of the Legislature. Section 739 requires a preliminary examination before information is filed, and section 872 requires a magistrate's order holding the defendant to answer upon the magistrate's finding reasonable cause to believe a public offense has been committed by the defendant. Again, there is no limitation of these provisions to felonies. That these provisions apply to misdemeanor and felony prosecutions alike in superior court was the conclusion reached in two early cases. It was claimed a preliminary examination was not required in misdemeanor cases in which the superior court functioned as a juvenile court.
The court also noted public offenses triable in the superior court must be prosecuted by indictment or information; the information must be filed after commitment by a magistrate. The court concluded: "It follows, therefore, that the preliminary examination and commitment are precedent conditions to the information upon which, and upon which only, can the superior court proceed to try one charged with a public offense, even though it be a misdemeanor." Filing the verified complaint in the superior court was insufficient to give that court jurisdiction inasmuch as prosecution of a case in the superior court must "be conducted under an information, as a prerequisite to the issuance of which the accused is entitled . . . to a preliminary examination and commitment, . . .a procedure which is applicable alike to the misdemeanor with which petitioners are charged, as well as to all others, jurisdiction to try which is vested in the superior court."
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that, where misdemeanor offenses are joined with felony offenses for trial in superior court, they are "public offenses triable in the superior court" and must be prosecuted in the same manner as required for felony offenses. This includes a finding of sufficient cause to believe the offense has been committed and the defendant is guilty thereof.
Let a peremptory writ of prohibition issue as prayed.
Disclaimer:
These summaries are provided by the SRIS Law Group. They represent the firm's unofficial views of the Justices' opinions. The original opinions should be consulted for their authoritative content
California Los Angeles County Charged Driving Stolen Vehicle Misdemeanor Peremptory Writ Lawyers Attorneys
