Board logo

subject: Winter War [print this page]


Background
Background

Main article: Background of the Winter War

Politics of Finland

Northern Europe in November 1939.:10 Neutral countriesGermany and annexed countriesSoviet Union and annexed countriesCountries with Soviet military bases

Finland constituted the eastern part of the Swedish kingdom for centuries before 1809. At this time, to protect its imperial capital, Saint Petersburg, Imperial Russia conquered Finland and converted it into an autonomous buffer state within the Russian Empire. Finland enjoyed wide autonomy until the end of the nineteenth century, when Russia began attempts to assimilate Finland as part of a general policy to strengthen the central government and unify the Empire through Russification. While abortive because of Russia's internal strife, these attempts ruined Russia's relations with the Finns and increased support for Finnish self-determination movements.:4-6

The outbreak of the First World War and the collapse of the Russian Empire gave Finland a window of opportunity; on 6 December 1917, the Senate of Finland declared the country's independence. The new Bolshevik Russian government was weak, and with the threat of civil war looming Soviet Russia recognized the new Finnish government just three weeks after the declaration of independence.:4-6 Sovereignty was fully achieved in May, 1918 after a short civil war and the expulsion of Bolshevik troops.:3

Finland joined the League of Nations in 1920. Finland sought security guarantees from the League, but its primary goal was cooperation with the Scandinavian countries. The Finnish and Swedish militaries engaged in wide-ranging cooperation, but were more focused on the exchange of information and defence planning for the land islands than on military exercises, or the stockpiling and deployment of materiel. Nevertheless, the Government of Sweden carefully avoided committing itself to Finnish foreign policy.:21-24 Another Finnish military policy was the top secret military cooperation between Finland and Estonia.:3334

The 1920s and early 1930s were a politically unstable time in Finland. The Communist Party of Finland was declared illegal in 1931, and the far-right Lapua Movement organised anti-Communist violence, which culminated in a failed uprising in 1932. Thereafter the ultra-nationalist Patriotic People's Movement (IKL) had a minor presence at most 14 seats out of 200 in the Finnish parliament.:26-27 By the late 1930s the export-oriented Finnish economy was growing and the country had almost solved its problems with extreme political movements.:18

Sovietinnish relations and politics

The Sovietinnish Non-Aggression Pact signed in Helsinki on 21 January 1932. On the left the Finnish foreign minister Aarno Yrj-Koskinen, and on the right the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, Ivan Maisky.

After the Soviet involvement in the Finnish Civil War in 1918, no formal peace treaty was signed. In 1918 and 1919, Finnish volunteer forces conducted two unsuccessful military incursions across the Russian border: the Viena and Aunus expeditions. In 1920, Finnish communists based in Soviet Russia attempted to assassinate the former Finnish White Guards Commander-in-Chief General C.G.E. Mannerheim. On 14 October 1920 Finland and Soviet Russia signed the Treaty of Tartu, confirming the new Finnishoviet border as the old border between the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland and Imperial Russia proper. In addition, Finland received Petsamo, with its ice-free harbour on the Arctic Ocean. Despite the signing of the treaty, relations between the two countries remained strained. The Finnish government allowed volunteers to cross the border to support the East Karelian Uprising in 1921, and Finnish communists in the Soviet Union continued to prepare for a revanche and staged a cross-border raid into Finland, called the "Pork mutiny", in 1922.:30-33

In 1932, the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Finland, which was reaffirmed for a ten-year period in 1934.:3033 However, relations between the two countries remained largely de minimis. While foreign trade in Finland was booming, less than one percent of Finnish trade was with the Soviet Union.:31 In 1934 the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations.:3033

During the Stalin era, Soviet propaganda painted Finland's leadership as a "vicious and reactionary Fascist clique". The Finnish Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim and the leader of the Finnish Social Democratic Party Vin Tanner were subjected to particular scorn.:32-33

With Joseph Stalin gaining near-absolute power through the Great Purge of 1938, the Soviet Union changed its foreign policy toward Finland in the late 1930s. The Soviet Union began pursuing the recovery of the provinces of Tsarist Russia lost during the chaos of the October Revolution and the Russian Civil War. The Soviet leadership believed that the old Empire had ideal security and territorial possessions, and wanted the newly christened city of Leningrad to enjoy a similar security.:28-29

Negotiations

In April 1938, an NKVD agent, Boris Yartsev contacted the Finnish foreign minister Rudolf Holsti and Prime Minister Aimo Cajander, stating that the Soviet Union did not trust Germany and that war was considered possible between the two countries. The Red Army would not wait passively behind the border but would rather "advance to meet the enemy." Finnish representatives assured Yartsev that Finland was committed to a policy of neutrality and that the country would resist any armed incursion. Yartsev suggested that Finland cede or lease some islands in the Gulf of Finland along the seaward approaches to Leningrad. Finland refused.:32-33:12-13

Negotiations continued throughout 1938 without results. Finnish reception of Soviet entreaties was decidedly cool, as the violent collectivisation and purges in Stalin's Soviet Union resulted in a poor opinion of the Soviet Union. In addition, most of the Finnish Communist elite in the Soviet Union had been executed during the Great Purge, further tarnishing the Soviet Union's image in Finland. At the same time, Finland was trying to negotiate a military co-operation plan with Sweden, hoping for a joint defense of the land islands.:34-35

The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed the Molotovibbentrop Pact in August 1939. The pact was nominally a non-aggression treaty, but it included a secret protocol in which the Eastern European countries were divided into spheres of interest. Finland fell into the Soviet sphere of interest. On 1 September 1939, Germany began its invasion of Poland and two days later Great Britain and France declared war against Germany. Shortly afterwards, the Soviets invaded eastern Poland. The Baltic states were later forced to accept treaties allowing the Soviets to establish military bases and to station troops on their soil.:6 The government of Estonia accepted the ultimatum, signing the corresponding agreement in September. Latvia and Lithuania followed in October. Unlike the Baltic states, Finland started a gradual mobilisation under the guise of "additional refresher training".:38-41

War preparations

Counsellor of state J.K. Paasikivi and his team arriving from Moscow for the first round of negotiations on 16 October 1939. From left, minister Aarno Yrj-Koskinen, J.K. Paasikivi, chief of staff Johan Nykopp and colonel Aladr Paasonen.

On 5 October 1939, the Soviet Union invited a Finnish delegation to Moscow for negotiations. J.K. Paasikivi, the Finnish ambassador to Sweden, was sent to Moscow to represent the Finnish government.:3841 The Soviets demanded that the border between the USSR and Finland on the Karelian Isthmus be moved westward to a point only 30kilometres (19mi) east of Viipuri and that the Finns destroy all existing fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus. They also demanded the cession of islands in the Gulf of Finland as well as the Kalastajansaarento peninsula. Furthermore, the Finns would have to lease the Hanko Peninsula for thirty years and permit the Soviets to establish a military base there. In exchange, the Soviet Union would cede two municipalities with twice the territory demanded from Finland.:3841:14-16 Accepting Soviet demands would have forced the Finns to dismantle their defences in Finnish Karelia.:4

The Soviet offer divided the Finnish government, but it was eventually rejected. On 31 October, in the assembly of the Supreme Soviet, Molotov announced Soviet demands in public. The Finns made two counteroffers whereby Finland would cede the Terijoki area to the Soviet Union, which would double the distance between Leningrad and Finnish border, far less than the Soviets had demanded.:41-43

Following the failure of negotiations, the Soviets started an intensive mobilisation near the Finnish border in 19381939. Assault troops necessary for invasion did not begin deployment until October 1939. Operational plans made in September called for the invasion to start in November.:55-56:141-148

Shelling of Mainila

On 26 November, a border incident was reported near the village of Mainila. A Soviet border guard post had been shelled by an unknown party resulting, according to Soviet reports, in the deaths of four and injuries of nine border guards. Research conducted by several Finnish and Russian historians later concluded that the shelling was carried out from the Soviet side of the border by an NKVD unit with the purpose of providing the Soviet Union with a casus belli and a pretext to withdraw from the non-aggression pact.:7778 "This is confirmed in Khrushchev's memoirs, where he states that Artillery Marshal Kulik personally supervised the bombardment of the Finnish village.":105:44-45

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov claimed it was a Finnish artillery attack and demanded that Finland apologise for the incident and move its forces beyond a line 2025 kilometres away from the border. Finland denied responsibility for the attack, rejected the demands, and called for a joint Finnishoviet commission to examine the incident. The Soviet Union then claimed that the Finnish response was hostile and renounced the non-aggression pact on 28 November. In the following years, Soviet historiography described the incident as a Finnish provocation. Doubt on the official Soviet version was cast only in the late 1980s, in the times of glasnost. However, the issue continued to divide Russian historiography even after the collapse of the Soviet Union.:99-100

Soviet political and military offensive

On 30 November, Soviet forces invaded Finland with 21 divisions, totaling some 450,000 men, and bombed Helsinki.:13:6 Later the Finnish statesman J.K. Paasikivi commented that the Soviet attack without a declaration of war violated three different non-aggression pacts: the Treaty of Tartu signed in 1920, the non-aggression pact between Finland and the Soviet Union signed in 1932 and again in 1934, and also the Charter of the League of Nations, which the Soviet Union signed in 1934.:4445 C.G.E. Mannerheim was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Defence Forces after the Soviet attack. In further reshuffling, the Finnish government named Risto Ryti as the new prime minister and Vin Tanner as foreign minister.:48-51

On 1 December, the Soviet Union formed a puppet government intended to rule Finland once the war was over. Called the Finnish Democratic Republic, it was headed by O.W. Kuusinen. The government was also called "The Terijoki Government", named after the village of Terijoki, the first place captured by the advancing Soviet army.:58 The puppet regime was unsuccessful and was quietly disbanded in early 1940. From the very outset of the war, working-class Finns stood behind the legal government in Helsinki.:61 Finnish national unity against the Soviet invasion was later called the spirit of the Winter War.:235

At the start of the Winter War, Finland brought up the matter of the Soviet invasion before the League of Nations. The League expelled the Soviet Union on 14 December 1939 and exhorted its members to aid Finland.:61

Soviet advance to the Mannerheim Line

Soviet military plan

Major Soviet offensives from 30 November 22 December 1939.

At the beginning of the war, total victory over Finland was expected within a few weeks. The Red Army had just finished the invasion of eastern Poland at a cost of less than a thousand casualties. Stalin's expectations of a quick Soviet triumph were backed up by the politician Andrei Zhdanov and military strategist Kliment Voroshilov, but other generals had their doubts. The chief of staff of the Red Army, Boris Shaposhnikov, advocated a serious buildup, extensive logistical and fire support preparations, and a rational order of battle, deploying the army's best units. Zhdanov's military commander Kirill Meretskov reported at the start of the hostilities: "The terrain of coming operations is split by lakes, rivers, swamps, and is almost entirely covered by forests... The proper use of our forces will be difficult." However, these doubts were not reflected in his troop deployments. Meretskov announced publicly that the Finnish campaign would take at the most two weeks. Soviet soldiers had even been warned not to cross the border into Sweden by mistake.:34

Stalin's purges decimated the officer corps of the Red Army; those purged included three of its five marshals, 220 of its 264 division-level commanders or higher, and 36,761 officers of all ranks. Fewer than half of the officers remained in total. They were commonly replaced by soldiers who were less competent but more loyal to their superiors. Furthermore unit commanders were superseded by a political commissar, who ratified military decisions on their political merits, further complicating the Soviet chain of command.:56:189

Soviet order of battle

Soviet generals were impressed by the success of the German blitzkrieg tactics. However, the blitzkrieg had been tailored to central European conditions with a dense, well-mapped network of paved roads. Armies fighting in central Europe had recognised supply and communications centres, which could be easily targeted by armored vehicle regiments. Finnish army centres, by contrast, were deep inside the country. There were no paved roads, and even gravel or dirt roads were scarce; most of the terrain consisted of trackless forests and swamps. Waging a blitzkrieg in Finland was a highly difficult proposition, and the Red Army failed to meet the level of tactical coordination and local initiative required to execute blitzkrieg tactics in the Finnish theatre.:35-36 This system of dual command destroyed the independence of commanding officers.:189

The Soviet forces were positioned as follows::38-39

The Seventh Army was located on the Karelian Isthmus. Comprising nine divisions, a tank corps and three tank brigades,:13 its objective was the city of Viipuri. The force was later divided into the Seventh and Thirteenth armies.

The Eighth Army was located north of Lake Ladoga. Comprising six divisions and a tank brigade,:13 its mission was to execute a flanking manoeuvre around the northern shore of Lake Ladoga to strike at the rear of the Mannerheim Line.

The Ninth Army was positioned to strike into central Finland. It was composed of three divisions with one additional division on its way.:13 Its mission was to thrust westward to cut Finland in half.

The Fourteenth Army was based in Murmansk. Comprising three divisions,:13 its objective was to capture the Arctic port of Petsamo and then advance to the town of Rovaniemi.

Finnish order of battle

Finnish ski troops in Northern Finland in January 1940.

See also: Finnish Army (1939)

The Finnish strategy was dictated by geography. The frontier with the Soviet Union was more than 1,000kilometres (620mi) long but was mostly impassable except along a handful of unpaved roads. In prewar calculations, the Finnish General Staff, which had established its wartime headquarters at Mikkeli,:38-39 estimated seven Soviet divisions on the Isthmus and no more than five along the whole border north of Lake Ladoga. In that case, the manpower ratio would favour the attacker by a ratio of 3:1. The true ratio was much higher; for example, twelve Soviet divisions were deployed to the north of Lake Ladoga.:42-44

An even greater problem than lack of soldiers was the lack of materiel; foreign shipments of antitank weapons and aircraft were arriving in small quantities. The ammunition situation was alarming, as stockpiles had cartridges, shells and fuel only for 1960 days. The ammunition shortage meant the Finns could seldom afford counterbattery or saturation fire. Finnish tank forces were operationally non-existent.:42-44

The Finnish forces were positioned as follows::47

The Army of the Isthmus was composed of six divisions under the command of Hugo sterman. The II. Army Corps was positioned on its right flank and the III. Army Corps was positioned on its left flank.

The IV. Army Corps was located north of Lake Ladoga. It was composed of two divisions under Juho Heiskanen, who was soon replaced by Woldemar Hgglund.

The North Finland Group was a collection of Civic Guards, border guards, and drafted reservist units under Wiljo Tuompo.

First battles

The war situation in December. Soviet units have reached the main Finnish defence line, the Mannerheim Line, on the Karelian Isthmus. Mannerheim LineFinnish Division (XX) or Corps (XXX)Soviet Division (XX), Corps (XXX) or Army (XXXX) -XX- Finnish Divisional Boundary

-XXX- Finnish Corps Boundary

The Finnish main defensive line, which became known as the Mannerheim Line, was located on the Karelian Isthmus about 30 to 75 kilometres (19 to 47mi) from the old Soviet/Finnish border. Red Army soldiers on the Isthmus numbered 250,000 facing 130,000 Finns. The Finnish command deployed a covering force of about 21,000 men in the area in front of the Mannerheim Line in order to delay and damage the Red Army before it reached the line.:69

In combat, the biggest cause of confusion among Finnish soldiers were Soviet tanks. The Finns had few anti-tank weapons and insufficient training in modern anti-tank tactics. However, the favoured Soviet armored tactic was a simple frontal charge, the weaknesses of which could be exploited. The Finns learned that at close range, tanks could be dealt with in many ways; for example, logs and crowbars jammed into the bogie wheels would often immobilise a tank. Soon, Fi

by: heiyou




welcome to loan (http://www.yloan.com/) Powered by Discuz! 5.5.0