subject: Massachusetts Drunk Driving Roadblock Initial Screening Discretion Lawyers Attorneys [print this page] COMMONWEALTH vsCOMMONWEALTH vs. GREGORY SWARTZ.
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS
July 23, 2009
Facts:
The defendant was arrested in the fall of 2006 at a roadblock established by the State police in Bridgewater as part of a sobriety checkpoint program to detect and deter drunk driving (sobriety checkpoint), and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, third offense, inviolation of G. L. c. 90, 24. The roadblock was conductedpursuant to State police General Order TRF-15 (TRF-15), which sets forth protocols and guidelines governing sobriety checkpoints conducted in Massachusetts, supplemented by orders and instructions specific to this roadblock included in the saturation patrol and sobriety checkpoint operational plans and directives (operations plan). At the time of the defendant's arrest, TRF-15 allowed, but did not require, an officer who makes an initial stop of a vehicle at a sobriety checkpoint to divert the vehicle to a secondary screening area for further inquiry when the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that the driver is operating while under the influence of alcohol or drugs (OUI) or has committed another violation of law. The trial court allowed the defendant's motion to suppress evidence and concluded that the guidelines contained in TRF-15 were unconstitutional on their face because of the discretion given to the screening officers. The Commonwealth appealed a judgment by the Brockton Division of the District Court Department Massachusetts.
Issues:
Whether TRF-15 allows a constitutionally impermissible amount of discretion to the initial screening officers to select which drivers are diverted to secondary screening?
Whether the sobriety checkpoint here was an unconstitutional roadblock to search generally for contraband or criminal activity, because officers were directed to divert vehicles to secondary screening if they observed contraband or otherwise reasonably suspected a felony or narcotic law violation?
1) Whether TRF-15 allows a constitutionally impermissible amount of discretion to the initial screening officers to select which drivers are diverted to secondary screening?
The Court held that "TRF-15 falls within constitutional parameters, because its guidelines permit a vehicle to be diverted to secondary screening only when the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that the driver has committed an OUI violation or another violation of law.
2) Whether the sobriety checkpoint here was an unconstitutional roadblock to search generally for contraband or criminal activity, because officers were directed to divert vehicles to secondary screening if they observed contraband or otherwise reasonably suspected a felony or narcotic law violation?
The Court conclude that a sobriety checkpoint does not become a roadblock whose purpose is to search for evidence of drug trafficking and other contraband simply because officers are directed that, when looking for signs of intoxication, they are not to ignore contraband or evidence of criminal activity in plain view.
Accordingly, this court reverses the order allowing the motion to suppress and remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings.
Disclaimer:
These summaries are provided by the SRIS Law Group. They represent the firm's unofficial views of the Justices' opinions. The original opinions should be consulted for their authoritative content
