subject: Massachusetts Motor Vehicle involuntary manslaughter conviction Homicide Drunk Driving Lawyers Attorneys [print this page] TY STOCKMAN TY STOCKMAN . BOARD OF APPEAL ON MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY POLICIES AND BONDS & another.
APPEALS COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS
September 30, 2004
Facts:
The plaintiff, Ty Stockman, was convicted in 1990 of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Subsequently he was prosecuted for anaccident that occurred in February, 1992, wherein one Shannon Parker was killed. In that prosecution, the jury returned verdicts of guilty of involuntary manslaughter and of motor vehicle homicide an offense that includes as an element a finding of driving while intoxicated. The trial judge dismissed the charge of motor vehicle homicide as duplicative for double jeopardy purposes, and sentenced Stockman on the manslaughter conviction. Noting thata consequence of the Jones procedure was to leave standing only a conviction (i.e., manslaughter) thaton its face did not suggest the death was caused by Stockman's drunk driving, the judge, cognizant that drunk driving convictions are the predicate for license revocations under G. L. c. 90, 24(1)(4). Upon receiving the court abstract, the registrar of motor vehicles suspended Stockman's license for ten years pursuant to 24G. When the registrar later discovered Stockman's prior conviction of driving while intoxicated in 1990, the registrar, acting in accordance with his understandingof G. L. c. 90, 24(1)(4), revoked for life Stockman's license to operate. On appeal, the defendant board of appeal on motor vehicle liability policies and bonds (board) upheld the suspension, as did the judge who reviewed the board's decision under G. L. c. 30A, 14. Plaintiff licensee sought review of a decision of the Hampshire Superior Court Department Massachusetts.
Issue:
Whether the registrar properly treated the involuntary manslaughter conviction as a conviction of motor vehicle homicide?
Conclusion:
The Court finds that where a conviction of motor vehicle homicide is dismissed for the reason that the jury also convicted the defendant of manslaughter for the same conduct,the registrar properly treats the manslaughter conviction as a conviction of motor vehicle homicide, and thus of driving while intoxicated, for purposes of applying the ten-year and lifetime revocation provisions of 24(1)(4) and 24G. For another instance where revocation of a license is mandated upon a conviction under 24, despite the fact that sentence was not imposed thereon. It would make little sense, as the judge who reviewed the board's decision observed, for "an offender who is found guilty of negligent homicide under a theory of operating under the influence to benefit from the additional, albeit more serious . . . conviction of involuntary manslaughter. Section 24(1)(4) did not require two separate DWI accidents involving two deaths. Rather, the licensee was subject to lifetime revocation of his license based on the original DWI conviction and the subsequent DWI accident resulting in a death. Further, based on the facts of the case, the registrar properly treated the involuntary manslaughter conviction as a conviction of motor vehicle homicide.
Disclaimer:
These summaries are provided by the SRIS Law Group. They represent the firm's unofficial views of the Justices' opinions. The original opinions should be consulted for their authoritative content
