subject: The Efficacy Of Construction Site Safety Inspections [print this page] M. Christopher Auld, Journal of Labor Economics Vol. 19
Government intervention in the sphere of occupational health and safety (OHS) in Canada and the United States has been increasing since the 1970s with more than 2,000 new safety rules enacted (Lanoie 1992a). Synchronized with the increase of OHS preventing injuries through interventions, workplace injury rates appear to be declining, and this correlation has been interpreted as evidence of the success of road OHS regulatory activities.Economic findings, however, which measures the influence of safety regulations in decreasing injury and accident in the workplace, offers miscellaneous results (Smith 1979; Viscusi 1979; Lanoie 1992b). Some studies using aggregate industry data, which might mask variations in the sphere of risk levels across industries, fail to get hold of a statistical connection proving the effects of OHS bylaw in regards to declining injury rate (Smith 1979). Studies using data disaggregated at the industry or else plant level have provided weak support in place of the efficacy of OHS regulations (Mendeloff 1979; Smith 1979; Cooke and Gautschi 1981; Viscusi 1986; Scholz and cloudy 1990; Lanoie 1992a).
Mendeloff (1979) finds statistical evidence of a post-U.S. Occupational Safety and Health and Act (OSHA) decline in the sphere of lost workday injuries in California manufacturing industries. However, Smith (1979) studies the influence of training OSHA safety inspections on manufacturing injury duty using panel data in place of 2,492 plants that cover 103 industries between the era of 1971-74. Smith finds that safety inspections significantly reduce injury rates in smaller plants, but the effectiveness of inspections diminishes over the course of time. Cooke and Gautschi (1981) in an examination of OSHA bylaw of manufacturing firms in Maine between the era of 1970-76 discover a significant negative connection between OSHA documents and days lost from injuries. They estimate that OSHA bylaws cost 29 workdays for each of the 100 employees in smaller firms and 51 workdays for each of the 100 workers in firms with more than 300 employees. Viscusi (1986) finds Cooke and Gautschi's estimates of reduced lost workdays implausibly high, however, as they would have represented a large increase in the level of workplace hazards in the absence of OSHA regulations. Viscusi suggests with the aim of Cooke and Gautschi's estimated OSHA effects were biased upward since the data set used in estimation integrated only firms that had been inspected.
Scholz and Gray (1990) examine OSHA inspection data and workplace injury data collected by the U.S. Government Department of Labor Statistics. They determined that both inspections and the threat of fines and convictions significantly reduced injury duty in the sphere of the administrative center. These results contrast sharply with those from Lanoie's (1992a) Canadian study. Lanoie estimates the influence of safety inspections, penalties, experience rating, and compensation remuneration on the risk of workplace accidents in the sphere of Quebec between the era of 1983-87. His estimates prove safety bylaw led to only minor reductions in the frequency of accidents in the workplace. Furthermore, Lanoie finds that safety inspections and experience rating seem to be associated with an increase in workdays lost per accident.
